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capacities. 24 A somewhat narrower rule in Fisher might have been
more desirable. Punitive damages might be desirable in certain special
areas as where the municipality's act was concurred in or ratified by
the body politic2 5 or where a municipality fails to abate an adjudged
6
nuisance.2
The Simpson decision was the only logical interpretation that the
supreme court could place on Hargrove without getting into a new
quagmire of distinctions between negligent and intentional torts.
Problems will arise, however, as to just what is a judicial, quasijudicial or legislative, quasi-legislative act by a municipality. Undoubtedly there will be a rash of suits against municipalities as a
result of the Simpson decision, but this difficulty seems to be overshadowed by public policy favoring a redress for every wrong. The
legislature could act to restrict municipal liability legislation. Such
legislation seems unlikely and Florida should profit under an enlightened rule that the burden of wrongs of the municipality should
not fall on the unfortunate citizen alone.
JOHN Roscow

INCOME TAX: DEDUCTION ALLOWED FOR THE
UNSUCCESSFUL DEFENSE OF A
CRIMINAL ACTION
Tellier v. Commissioner,342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965)
Taxpayer, through Tellier and Company, was engaged in the
business of underwriting and selling securities. Tellier and Company,
although operated as a partnership, was in fact wholly controlled by
the taxpayer. As a result of his business activities taxpayer was tried
on a thirty-six count indictment charging him with violations of the
Securities Act of 1933,' the mail fraud statute, 2 and with conspiracy to
violate these statutes.3 A conviction ensued, with attending prison
24.
25.
26.

Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So. 2d 442 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
St. Johns Gas Co. v. City of San Juan, 1 P.R. Fed. 160 (1902).
Kelly v. Cape Girardeau, 338 Mo. 103, 89 S.W.2d 41 (1935) (sewage running

across plaintiffs land).
1. 48 Stat. 84 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77q (a) (1958).
2. 18 U.S.C. §1341 (1958).
3. 18 U.S.C. §371 (1958).
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sentence and fine. On his 1956 return taxpayer claimed a $22,964.20
deduction consisting of attorneys' fees and other legal expenses, as an
ordinary and necessary business expense. 4 The Commissioner disallowed this deduction and his ruling was sustained by the Tax
Court.5 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals, second circuit, reversed and HELD, legal expenses, proximately connected with
the conduct of a trade or business, are deductible where they arise out
of the unsuccessful defense of a criminal suit.
Prior to this case it was settled law that expenses incurred in the
defense of an unsuccessful criminal suit were not deductible;6 whereas, the same expenses incurred in the successful defense of either a
criminal or civil suit were deductible.7 There are generally four
theories advanced to doctrinally justify denying the deduction where
the judgment is adverse to the taxpayer:8
(1) the court is merely following stare decisis9
(2) the expenses occasioned by unlawful activities are not
°
ordinary and necessary in the conduct of a business
(3) the allowance of a deduction for such expenses is contrary
policy1 '
public
to
(4) the test has also been formulated in terms of proximate
cause' 2 - that is if the trier of fact finds that the litigation is not
directly connected with the business of the taxpayer, then the
expense is a nondeductible personal item.1
The residual problem of deciding what is an unsuccessful defense has
spawned a great deal of confusion. As examples, suits involving a
compromise settlement, 4 plea of nolo contendere," withdrawal of
4. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §162 (a).
5. Tellier v. Commissioner, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 163,212 (1963).
6. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co., 18 B.T.A.
101 (1929) (two dissents), afl'd, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931), cited with approval in
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943); Estate of Morris I. Ritholz,
P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 163,136 (1963).
7. Citron-Byer Co., 21 B.T.A. 308 (1930) (criminal); Robert S. Howard, 32
T.C. 1284 (1959) (civil).
8. In any given judicial opinion these four theories are generally interwoven
and, for that reason, in notes 8-11 only the case that seems to focus on the
enumerated theory is cited.
9. See Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956).
10. See Pantages Theatre Co. v. Welch, 71 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1934). Cf. Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1927).
11. See Acker v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958).
12. See Port v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 645 (Ct. Cl. 1958).

13.

INT. REv.

CODE OF

1954, §262.

14. See Helvering v. Superior Wines & Liquors, 134 F.2d 373 (8th Cir. 1943).
15. See Bell v. Commissioner, 320 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1963); Commissioner v.
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warrant in a criminal case' 6 are all products of this confusion. The
attempt to apply a rule that seeks to distinguish between civil and
criminal liability has also generated repeated difficulty in borderline
cases17 and severe criticism from commentators.' 8 In fact, the entire
subject of deducting expenses incurred in criminal activity has generated a wealth of confusion, for the revenue agent as well as for
the criminal.' 9
The early attitude of the Supreme Court, in this area, was one
of austere reservation. When confronted with the possible deduction
of expenses incurred in a criminal endeavor Justice Holmes said, "it
will be time enough to consider the question when a taxpayer has
the temerity to raise it."20° The philosophy behind this remark subsequently crystallized into a judicially formulated public policy against
deducting expenses that can be characterized as falling within the gray
area of illegal expenses. This basic attitude is dearly one of the
motivating forces behind the dichotomy drawn by courts between a
successful and an unsuccessful suit.
Inroads have been made, however, even where the taxpayer is
unsuccessful. In Commissioner v. Heininger the Supreme Court allowed a deduction for expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense
of a civil suit.21 In Heininger, the taxpayer attempted to deduct expenses incurred in unsuccessfully resisting issuance by the Postmaster
General of a fraud order. The fees were "necessary," the Court said,
because there was no suggestion that the "defense was in bad faith"
or that the attorney's fees were "unreasonable"; and "ordinary" in
the generally accepted meaning of the term. Any universal application of this reasoning was weakened by the statement that "whether
an expenditure is directly related to a business and whether it is ordinary and necessary are doubtless pure questions of fact in most inShapiro, 278 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1960); Standard Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 40
T.C. 858 (1963).
16. See John V. Clark, 30 T.C. 1330 (1958).
17. See, e.g., Estate of G.A. Buder, P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 63,073 (1963), afl'd
on other issues, 530 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1964); David R. Foulk, 26 T.C. 948 (1956);
Tracy v. United States, 284 F.2d 379 (Ct. C1. 1960). But see Commissioner v.
Schwartz, 232 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1956).
18

See, e.g., Note, Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51

CoLuM. L. REv. 752, 756-68 (1951); Note, Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54 HARv. L. REV. 852, 854-57 (1941); Note, Business
Expenses, Disallowances, and Public Policy, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 132-36 (1962).
19. For an excellent analysis of this entire problem area (inter alia, fines and
penalties, litigation expenses, illegal expenditures, and the expenses of an illegal
business) see Note, Business Expenses, Disallowances, and Public Policy, 72 YALE

L.J. 108 (1962).
20. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S 259, 264 (1927).
21. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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stances." This can be a substantial hurdle.22 Further confusion arises
from the manner in which the Government's public policy argument
was rejected in Heininger. The Court reasoned as follows:
(1) the deduction is to be disallowed only if it frustrates
sharply defined policies of the civil fraud statutes in question;
(2) the purpose of the statute is to protect the public from
fraudulent practices (statutory punishment being provided for in
its criminal counterpart), thereby implying that to deny the deduction would be a punishment;
(3) the policy of the civil fraud statute is not to deter the employment of counsel, implying a disallowance of the deduction
would be such a deterrence.
An additional twist was added to the public policy argument in
Lilly v. Commissioner in which the taxpayer attempted to deduct
lawful, although ethically questionable, "kickbacks" to doctors.2 3 The
Tax Court felt the absence of statutory law condemning the practice
24
was not in itself sufficient evidence of the absence of such a policy.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Tax Court and formulated
the test that to deny the deduction of an ordinary and necessary
business expense on grounds of public policy "the policies frustrated
must be national or state policies evidenced by some governmental
declaration of them."
The court, in Tellier, relies on Heininger and Lilly for the proposition that the litigation expenses incurred by Tellier and Company
are ordinary and necessary, and since there is no "governmental
declaration" of a "sharply defined" policy to discourage the hiring of
counsel, or the incurring of other legal expenses in defending against
a criminal charge, the deduction should be allowed. Thus, the court
refused to distinguish between civil and criminal cases or between
successful and unsuccessful defenses.
With full recognition that the reasoning behind Tellier is inexorably bound with other recent judicial pronouncements that embellish the defendant's constitutional right to counsel, one might,
nevertheless, question whether the judicial reasoning to date is completely justified. An initial objection is the circuitous logic employed
by the court. The court reasoned as follows:
22. See Peckham v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1964). Taxpayer, a
licensed physician, was convicted of performing an illegal abortion -subsequently
his license to practice medicine was revoked; HELD, the litigation expenses were
not related to his profession and, therefore, were not deductible as a business
expense.
23. 343 U.S. 90 (1952)
24. 14 T.C. 1066 (1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951).
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(1) the deduction must be allowed
(2) otherwise, this would deter the employment of counsel
(3) since there is no "governmental declaration" of a "sharply
defined national or state" policy to discourage the hiring of counsel, citing Lilly
(4) and, since this is an ordinary and necessary business expense, citing Heininger
(5) the deduction must be allowed.
There are two fundamental errors in this reasoning. First, the issue
is not whether there exists a public policy to deter the employment
of counsel. Certainly everyone agrees no such policy exists and the
court's citation of authority merely belabors the point. The issue is
whether there is a public policy against deducting litigation expenses
incurred in unsuccessfully defending a criminal suit. The answer to
this question is most emphatically in the affirmative. Forty-one years
of settled case law is certainly a "sharply defined governmental declaration" of such a policy. Second, the court attempts to bridge the
gap between these two issues by presupposing a denial of the deduction would "deter the employment of counsel." Is this warranted?
Tellier is not focused on the "indigent businessman" who, by reason
of his financial plight, is denied a fundamental constitutional guarantee - the right to counsel. To reach the deduction problems posed by
Tellier the expense must have been incurred. Counsel was employed.
Perhaps the court is saying that many businessmen today are not
employing counsel simply because at the end of the year they are unable to deduct the expense. This position appears untenable.
The courts have further argued that to deny the deduction would
be a penalty and, therefore, not the function of the income tax. This
seems a bit naive. If we can say that to deny the deduction is a
penalty, why can we not say that to allow the deduction is a reward?
It is virtually impossible to separate a tax decision from its impact on
the public and, therefore, a strong force in molding public policy is
inherent in the very magnitude of our tax system.
Finally, it is important to note that the judiciary is confined to
an ad hoc treatment of the problem area. Why should the criminal
defendant whose litigation expenses arise in other than a business
context be discriminated against? If the court's reasoning is entirely
sound, the logical approach would be for Congress to allow the deduction of litigation expenses for all criminals regardless of whether
the crime occurred in a business context.
Many of the commentators have indicated that to permit the deduction, in a situation such as Tellier, is merely a logical extension
of the Heininger rule (litigation expenses incurred in unsuccessful
civil suit are deductible). Tellier, however, is not a situation that calls
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for extending a rule that is based on a rather dubious footing. Unless
the Supreme Court is willing to grapple with the underlying public
policy argument, it will, hopefully, if faced with Tellier, reverse the
Second Circuit. This reversal would firmly reestablish the policy that
businessmen, who incur expenses in the unsuccessful defense of a
criminal suit, will be accorded the same tax treatment as any other
person convicted of a crime. In neither case would the cost be spread
to the population as a whole. At the very least, Tellier presents to
the Supreme Court an opportunity to clear up a great deal of confusion.
JOEL STRAWN
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